FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U.S. ___ (2024) (2024)

NOTICE: This opinion is subject toformal revision before publication in the United States Reports.Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, SupremeCourt of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543,pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formalerrors.SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES_________________Nos. 23–235 and 23–236_________________FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION,etal., PETITIONERS23–235v.ALLIANCE FOR HIPPOCRATIC MEDICINE,etal.DANCO LABORATORIES, L.L.C.,PETITIONER23–236v.ALLIANCE FOR HIPPOCRATIC MEDICINE,etal.on writs of certiorari to the united statescourt of appeals for the fifth circuit[June 13, 2024]Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of theCourt.In 2016 and 2021, the Food and DrugAdministration relaxed its regulatory requirements formifepristone, an abortion drug. Those changes made it easier fordoctors to prescribe and pregnant women to obtain mifepristone.Several pro-life doctors and associations sued FDA, arguing thatFDA’s actions violated the Administrative Procedure Act. But theplaintiffs do not prescribe or use mifepristone. And FDA is notrequiring them to do or refrain from doing anything. Rather, theplaintiffs want FDA to make mifepristone more difficult for otherdoctors to prescribe and for pregnant women to obtain. UnderArticle III of the Constitution, a plaintiff’s desire to makea drug less available for others does not establish standingto sue. Nor do the plaintiffs’ other standing theories suffice.Therefore, the plaintiffs lack standing to challenge FDA’sactions.IAUnder federal law, the U.S. Food andDrug Administration, an agency within the Executive Branch, ensuresthat drugs on the market are safe and effective. For FDA to approvea new drug, the drug sponsor (usually the drug’s manufacturer orpotential marketer) must submit an application demonstrating thatthe drug is safe and effective when used as directed. 21U.S.C. §355(d). The sponsor’s application mustgenerally include proposed labeling that specifies the drug’sdosage, how to take the drug, and the specific conditions that thedrug may treat. 21 CFR §§201.5, 314.50 (2022).If FDA determines that additional safetyrequirements are necessary, FDA may impose extra requirements onprescription and use of the drug. 21 U.S.C.§355–1(f)(3). For example, FDA may require that prescribersundergo specialized training; mandate that the drug be dispensedonly in certain settings like hospitals; or direct that doctorsmonitor patients taking the drug. Ibid.In 2000, FDA approved a new drug application formifepristone tablets marketed under the brand name Mifeprex. FDAapproved Mifeprex for use to terminate pregnancies, but only up toseven weeks of pregnancy. To help ensure that Mifeprex would beused safely and effectively, FDA placed further restrictions on thedrug’s use and distribution. For example, only doctors couldprescribe or supervise prescription of Mifeprex. Doctors andpatients also had to follow a strict regimen requiring the patientto appear for three in-person visits with the doctor. And FDAdirected prescribing doctors to report incidents ofhospitalizations, blood transfusions, or other serious adverseevents to the drug sponsor (who, in turn, was required to reportthe events to FDA).In 2015, Mifeprex’s distributor DancoLaboratories submitted a supplemental new drug application seekingto amend Mifeprex’s labeling and to relax some of the restrictionsthat FDA had imposed. In 2016, FDA approved the proposed changes.FDA deemed Mifeprex safe to terminate pregnancies up to 10 weeksrather than 7 weeks. FDA allowed healthcare providers such as nursepractitioners to prescribe Mifeprex. And FDA approved a dosingregimen that reduced the number of required in-person visits fromthree to one—a single visit to receive Mifeprex. In addition, FDAchanged prescribers’ adverse event reporting obligations to requireprescribers to report only fatalities—a reporting requirement thatwas still more stringent than the requirements for most otherdrugs.In 2019, FDA approved an application for genericmifepristone. FDA established the same conditions of use forgeneric mifepristone as for Mifeprex.In 2021, FDA again relaxed the requirements forMifeprex and generic mifepristone. Relying on experience gainedduring the COVID–19 pandemic about pregnant women usingmifepristone without an in-person visit to a healthcare provider,FDA announced that it would no longer enforce the initial in-personvisit requirement.BBecause mifepristone is used to terminatepregnancies, FDA’s approval and regulation of mifepristone havegenerated substantial controversy from the start. In 2002, threepro-life associations submitted a joint citizen petition asking FDAto rescind its approval of Mifeprex. FDA denied their petition.In 2019, two pro-life medical associations filedanother petition, this time asking FDA to withdraw its 2016modifications to mifepristone’s conditions of use. FDA denied thatpetition as well.This case began in 2022. Four pro-life medicalassociations, as well as several individual doctors, sued FDA inthe U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas.Plaintiffs brought claims under the Administrative Procedure Act.They challenged the lawfulness of FDA’s 2000 approval of Mifeprex;FDA’s 2019 approval of generic mifepristone; and FDA’s 2016 and2021 actions modifying mifepristone’s conditions of use. DancoLaboratories, which sponsors Mifeprex, intervened to defend FDA’sactions. The plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction thatwould require FDA to rescind approval of mifepristone or, at thevery least, to rescind FDA’s 2016 and 2021 actions.The District Court agreed with the plaintiffsand in effect enjoined FDA’s approval of mifepristone, therebyordering mifepristone off the market. 668 F.Supp. 3d 507 (NDTex. 2023). The court first held that the plaintiffs possessedArticle III standing. It then determined that the plaintiffs werelikely to succeed on the merits of each of their claims. Finally,the court concluded that the plaintiffs would suffer irreparableharm from FDA’s continued approval of mifepristone and that aninjunction would serve the public interest.FDA and Danco promptly appealed and moved tostay the District Court’s order pending appeal. The U.S.Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted the stay motion inpart and temporarily reinstated FDA’s approval of Mifeprex. 2023 WL2913725, *21 (Apr. 12, 2023). But the Court of Appeals declined tostay the rest of the District Court’s order. The Court of Appeals’partial stay would have left Mifeprex (though not genericmifepristone) on the market, but only under the more stringentrequirements imposed when FDA first approved Mifeprex in2000—available only up to seven weeks of pregnancy, only whenprescribed by doctors, and only with three in-person visits, amongother requirements.FDA and Danco then sought a full stay in thisCourt. This Court stayed the District Court’s order in its entiretypending the disposition of FDA’s and Danco’s appeals in the Courtof Appeals and ultimate resolution by this Court. 598 U.S.___ (2023). As a result of this Court’s stay, Mifeprex and genericmifepristone have remained available as allowed by FDA’s relaxed2016 and 2021 requirements.A few months later, the Court of Appeals issuedits decision on the merits of the District Court’s order, affirmingin part and vacating in part. 78 F.4th 210, 222–223 (CA52023). The Court of Appeals first concluded that the individualdoctors and the pro-life medical associations had standing. TheCourt of Appeals next concluded that plaintiffs were not likely tosucceed on their challenge to FDA’s 2000 approval of Mifeprex and2019 approval of generic mifepristone. So the Court of Appealsvacated the District Court’s order as to those agency actions. Butthe Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that plaintiffswere likely to succeed in showing that FDA’s 2016 and 2021 actionswere unlawful.The Court of Appeals’ merits decision did notalter this Court’s stay of the District Court’s order pending thisCourt’s review. This Court then granted certiorari with respect tothe 2016 and 2021 FDA actions held unlawful by the Court ofAppeals. 601 U.S. ___ (2023).IIThe threshold question is whether theplaintiffs have standing to sue under Article III of theConstitution. Article III standing is a “bedrock constitutionalrequirement that this Court has applied to all manner of importantdisputes.” United States v. Texas, 599 U.S. 670, 675(2023). Standing is “built on a single basic idea—the idea ofseparation of powers.” Ibid. (quotation marks omitted).Importantly, separation of powers “was not simply an abstractgeneralization in the minds of the Framers: it was woven into thedocument that they drafted in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787.”TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 422–423(2021) (quotation marks omitted). Therefore, we begin as alwayswith the precise text of the Constitution.Article III of the Constitution confines thejurisdiction of federal courts to “Cases” and “Controversies.” Thecase or controversy requirement limits the role of the FederalJudiciary in our system of separated powers. As this Courtexplained to President George Washington in 1793 in response to hisrequest for a legal opinion, federal courts do not issue advisoryopinions about the law—even when requested by the President. 13Papers of George Washington: Presidential Series 392 (C. Patricked. 2007). Nor do federal courts operate as an open forum forcitizens “to press general complaints about the way in whichgovernment goes about its business.” Allen v. Wright,468 U.S.737, 760 (1984) (quotation marks omitted); seeCalifornia v. Texas, 593 U.S. 659, 673 (2021);Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United forSeparation of Church and State, Inc., 454U.S. 464, 487 (1982); United States v.Richardson, 418 U.S.166, 175 (1974); Exparte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634(1937) (percuriam); Massachusetts v.Mellon, 262 U.S.447, 487–488 (1923); Fairchild v. Hughes,258 U.S.126, 129–130 (1922).As Justice Scalia memorably said, Article IIIrequires a plaintiff to first answer a basic question:“‘What’s it to you?’” A. Scalia, The Doctrine ofStanding as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17Suffolk U.L.Rev. 881, 882 (1983). For a plaintiff toget in the federal courthouse door and obtain a judicialdetermination of what the governing law is, the plaintiff cannot bea mere bystander, but instead must have a “personal stake” in thedispute. TransUnion, 594 U.S., at 423. The requirementthat the plaintiff possess a personal stake helps ensure thatcourts decide litigants’ legal rights in specific cases, as ArticleIII requires, and that courts do not opine on legal issues inresponse to citizens who might “roam the country in search ofgovernmental wrongdoing.” Valley Forge, 454 U.S., at487; see, e.g., Schlesinger v. ReservistsComm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S.208, 227 (1974); Richardson, 418 U.S., at 175;Tyler v. Judges of Court of Registration, 179 U.S.405, 406 (1900). Standing also “tends to assure that the legalquestions presented to the court will be resolved, not in therarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concretefactual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of theconsequences of judicial action.” Valley Forge, 454U.S., at 472. Moreover, the standing doctrine serves toprotect the “autonomy” of those who are most directly affected sothat they can decide whether and how to challenge the defendant’saction. Id., at 473.By limiting who can sue, the standingrequirement implements “the Framers’ concept of the proper—andproperly limited—role of the courts in a democratic society.” J.Roberts, Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DukeL.J. 1219, 1220 (1993) (quotation marks omitted). Inparticular, the standing requirement means that the federal courtsdecide some contested legal questions later rather than sooner,thereby allowing issues to percolate and potentially be resolved bythe political branches in the democratic process. See Rainesv. Byrd, 521 U.S.811, 829–830 (1997); cf. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’lUSA, 568 U.S.398, 420–422 (2013). And the standing requirement means thatthe federal courts may never need to decide some contested legalquestions: “Our system of government leaves many crucial decisionsto the political processes,” where democratic debate can occur anda wide variety of interests and views can be weighed.Schlesinger, 418 U.S., at 227; see Campbell v.Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 23 (CADC 2000).AThe fundamentals of standing are well-knownand firmly rooted in American constitutional law. To establishstanding, as this Court has often stated, a plaintiff mustdemonstrate (i)that she has suffered or likely will suffer aninjury in fact, (ii)that the injury likely was caused or willbe caused by the defendant, and (iii)that the injury likelywould be redressed by the requested judicial relief. SeeSummers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S.488, 493 (2009); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,504 U.S.555, 560–561 (1992). Those specific standing requirementsconstitute “an essential and unchanging part of thecase-or-controversy requirement of Article III.” Id., at560.The second and third standingrequirements—causation and redressability—are often “flip sides ofthe same coin.” Sprint Communications Co. v. APCCServices, Inc., 554 U.S.269, 288 (2008). If a defendant’s action causes an injury,enjoining the action or awarding damages for the action willtypically redress that injury. So the two key questions in moststanding disputes are injury in fact and causation.[1]First is injury in fact. An injury infact must be “concrete,” meaning that it must be real and notabstract. See TransUnion, 594 U.S., at 424. The injuryalso must be particularized; the injury must affect “the plaintiffin a personal and individual way” and not be a generalizedgrievance. Lujan, 504 U.S., at 560, n. 1. An injury infact can be a physical injury, a monetary injury, an injury toone’s property, or an injury to one’s constitutional rights, totake just a few common examples. Moreover, the injury must beactual or imminent, not speculative—meaning that the injury musthave already occurred or be likely to occur soon. Clapper,568 U.S., at 409. And when a plaintiff seeks prospectiverelief such as an injunction, the plaintiff must establish asufficient likelihood of future injury. Id., at 401.By requiring the plaintiff to show an injury infact, Article III standing screens out plaintiffs who might haveonly a general legal, moral, ideological, or policy objection to aparticular government action. For example, a citizen does not havestanding to challenge a government regulation simply because theplaintiff believes that the government is acting illegally. SeeValley Forge, 454 U.S., at 473, 487. A citizen may notsue based only on an “asserted right to have the Government act inaccordance with law.” Allen, 468 U.S., at 754;Schlesinger, 418 U.S., at 225–227. Nor may citizenssue merely because their legal objection is accompanied by a strongmoral, ideological, or policy objection to a government action. SeeValley Forge, 454 U.S., at 473.The injury in fact requirement prevents thefederal courts from becoming a “vehicle for the vindication of thevalue interests of concerned bystanders.” Allen, 468U.S., at 756 (quotation marks omitted). An Article III courtis not a legislative assembly, a town square, or a faculty lounge.Article III does not contemplate a system where 330 millioncitizens can come to federal court whenever they believe that thegovernment is acting contrary to the Constitution or other federallaw. See id., at 754. Vindicating “the publicinterest (including the public interest in Government observance ofthe Constitution and laws) is the function of Congress and theChief Executive.” Lujan, 504 U.S., at 576.In sum, to sue in federal court, a plaintiffmust show that he or she has suffered or likely will suffer aninjury in fact.Second is causation. The plaintiff mustalso establish that the plaintiff’s injury likely was causedor likely will be caused by the defendant’s conduct.Government regulations that require or forbidsome action by the plaintiff almost invariably satisfy both theinjury in fact and causation requirements. So in those cases,standing is usually easy to establish. See Lujan, 504U.S., at 561–562; see, e.g., Susan B.Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S.149, 162–163 (2014).By contrast, when (as here) a plaintiffchallenges the government’s “unlawful regulation (or lack ofregulation) of someone else,” “standing is not precluded,but it is ordinarily substantially more difficult to establish.”Lujan, 504 U.S., at 562 (quotation marks omitted); seeSummers, 555 U.S., at 493. That is often becauseunregulated parties may have more difficulty establishingcausation—that is, linking their asserted injuries to thegovernment’s regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else.See Clapper, 568 U.S., at 413–414; Lujan, 504U.S., at 562; Duke Power Co. v. CarolinaEnvironmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S.59, 74 (1978); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare RightsOrganization, 426 U.S.26, 41–46 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.490, 504–508 (1975).When the plaintiff is an unregulated party,causation “ordinarily hinge[s] on the response of the regulated (orregulable) third party to the government action or inaction—andperhaps on the response of others as well.” Lujan, 504U.S., at 562. Yet the Court has said that plaintiffsattempting to show causation generally cannot “rely on speculationabout the unfettered choices made by independent actors not beforethe courts.” Clapper, 568 U.S., at 415, n.5(quotation marks omitted); see also Bennett v. Spear,520 U.S.154, 168–169 (1997). Therefore, to thread the causation needlein those circ*mstances, the plaintiff must show that the“‘third parties will likely react in predictable ways’”that in turn will likely injure the plaintiffs. California,593 U.S., at 675 (quoting Department of Commerce v.New York, 588 U.S. 752, 768 (2019)).As this Court has explained, the “line ofcausation between the illegal conduct and injury”—the “links in thechain of causation,” Allen, 468 U.S., at 752, 759—mustnot be too speculative or too attenuated, Clapper, 568U.S., at 410–411. The causation requirement precludesspeculative links—that is, where it is not sufficiently predictablehow third parties would react to government action or causedownstream injury to plaintiffs. See Allen, 468 U. S., at757–759; Simon, 426 U.S., at 41–46. The causationrequirement also rules out attenuated links—that is, where thegovernment action is so far removed from its distant (even ifpredictable) ripple effects that the plaintiffs cannot establishArticle III standing. See Allen, 468 U. S., at 757–759; cf.Department of Commerce, 588 U.S., at 768.The causation requirement is central to ArticleIII standing. Like the injury in fact requirement, the causationrequirement screens out plaintiffs who were not injured by thedefendant’s action. Without the causation requirement, courts wouldbe “virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness” ofgovernment action. Allen, 468 U.S., at 760 (quotationmarks omitted).Determining causation in cases involving suitsby unregulated parties against the government is admittedly not a“mechanical exercise.” Id., at 751. That is because thecausation inquiry can be heavily fact-dependent and a “question ofdegree,” as private petitioner’s counsel aptly described it here.Tr. of Oral Arg. 50. Unfortunately, applying the law of standingcannot be made easy, and that is particularly true for causation.Just as causation in tort law can pose line-drawing difficulties,so too can causation in standing law when determining whether anunregulated party has standing.That said, the “absence of precise definitions”has not left courts entirely “at sea in applying the law ofstanding.” Allen, 468 U.S., at 751. Like “most legalnotions, the standing concepts have gained considerable definitionfrom developing case law.” Ibid. As the Court has explained,in “many cases the standing question can be answered chiefly bycomparing the allegations of the particular complaint to those madein prior standing cases.” Id., at 751–752. Stated otherwise,assessing standing “in a particular case may be facilitated byclarifying principles or even clear rules developed in priorcases.” Id., at 752.Consistent with that understanding of howstanding principles can develop and solidify, the Court hasidentified a variety of familiar circ*mstances where governmentregulation of a third-party individual or business may be likely tocause injury in fact to an unregulated plaintiff. For example, whenthe government regulates (or under-regulates) a business, theregulation (or lack thereof) may cause downstream or upstreameconomic injuries to others in the chain, such as certainmanufacturers, retailers, suppliers, competitors, or customers.E.g., National Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat.Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S.479, 488, n. 4 (1998); General Motors Corp. v.Tracy, 519 U.S.278, 286–287 (1997); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S.159, 162–164 (1970); Association of Data Processing ServiceOrganizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397U.S. 150, 152 (1970). When the government regulates parks,national forests, or bodies of water, for example, the regulationmay cause harm to individual users. E.g., Summers,555 U.S., at 494. When the government regulates one property,it may reduce the value of adjacent property. The list goes on.See, e.g., Department of Commerce, 588U.S., at 766–768.As those cases illustrate, to establishcausation, the plaintiff must show a predictable chain of eventsleading from the government action to the asserted injury—in otherwords, that the government action has caused or likely will causeinjury in fact to the plaintiff.[2]BHere, the plaintiff doctors and medicalassociations are unregulated parties who seek to challenge FDA’sregulation of others. Specifically, FDA’s regulationsapply to doctors prescribing mifepristone and to pregnant womentaking mifepristone. But the plaintiff doctors and medicalassociations do not prescribe or use mifepristone. And FDA has notrequired the plaintiffs to do anything or to refrain from doinganything.The plaintiffs do not allege the kinds ofinjuries described above that unregulated parties sometimes canassert to demonstrate causation. Because the plaintiffs do notprescribe, manufacture, sell, or advertise mifepristone or sponsora competing drug, the plaintiffs suffer no direct monetary injuriesfrom FDA’s actions relaxing regulation of mifepristone. Nor do theysuffer injuries to their property, or to the value of theirproperty, from FDA’s actions. Because the plaintiffs do not usemifepristone, they obviously can suffer no physical injuries fromFDA’s actions relaxing regulation of mifepristone.Rather, the plaintiffs say that they arepro-life, oppose elective abortion, and have sincere legal, moral,ideological, and policy objections to mifepristone being prescribedand used by others. The plaintiffs appear to recognize thatthose general legal, moral, ideological, and policy concerns do notsuffice on their own to confer Article III standing to sue infederal court. So to try to establish standing, the plaintiffsadvance several complicated causation theories to connect FDA’sactions to the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries in fact.The first set of causation theories contendsthat FDA’s relaxed regulation of mifepristone may cause downstreamconscience injuries to the individual doctor plaintiffs and thespecified members of the plaintiff medical associations, who arealso doctors. (We will refer to them collectively as “thedoctors.”) The second set of causation theories asserts that FDA’srelaxed regulation of mifepristone may cause downstream economicinjuries to the doctors. The third set of causation theoriesmaintains that FDA’s relaxed regulation of mifepristone causesinjuries to the medical associations themselves, who assert theirown organizational standing. As we will explain, none of thetheories suffices to establish Article III standing.1We first address the plaintiffs’ claim thatFDA’s relaxed regulation of mifepristone causes conscience injuriesto the doctors.The doctors contend that FDA’s 2016 and 2021actions will cause more pregnant women to suffer complications frommifepristone, and those women in turn will need more emergencyabortions by doctors. The plaintiff doctors say that they thereforemay be required—against their consciences—to render emergencytreatment completing the abortions or providing otherabortion-related treatment.The Government correctly acknowledges that aconscience injury of that kind constitutes a concrete injury infact for purposes of Article III. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 11–12;TransUnion, 594 U.S., at 425; see, e.g.,Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S.352 (2015). So doctors would have standing to challenge agovernment action that likely would cause them to provide medicaltreatment against their consciences.But in this case—even assuming for the sake ofargument that FDA’s 2016 and 2021 changes to mifepristone’sconditions of use cause more pregnant women to require emergencyabortions and that some women would likely seek treatment fromthese plaintiff doctors—the plaintiff doctors have not shown thatthey could be forced to participate in an abortion or provideabortion-related medical treatment over their conscienceobjections.That is because, as the Government explains,federal conscience laws definitively protect doctors from beingrequired to perform abortions or to provide other treatment thatviolates their consciences. See 42 U.S.C.§300a–7(c)(1); see also H.R. 4366, 118th Cong., 2d Sess.,Div. C, Title II, §203 (2024). The Church Amendments, for instance,speak clearly. They allow doctors and other healthcare personnel to“refus[e] to perform or assist” an abortion without punishment ordiscrimination from their employers. 42 U.S.C.§300a–7(c)(1). And the Church Amendments more broadly provide thatdoctors shall not be required to provide treatment or assistancethat would violate the doctors’ religious beliefs or moralconvictions. §300a–7(d). Most if not all States have consciencelaws to the same effect. See N. Sawicki, Protections From CivilLiability in State Abortion Conscience Laws, 322 JAMA 1918 (2019);see, e.g., Tex. Occ. Code Ann. §103.001 (West2022).Moreover, as the Government notes, federalconscience protections encompass “the doctor’s beliefs rather thanparticular procedures,” meaning that doctors cannot be required totreat mifepristone complications in any way that would violate thedoctors’ consciences. Tr. of Oral Arg. 37; see §300a–7(c)(1). Asthe Government points out, that strong protection for conscienceremains true even in a so-called healthcare desert, where otherdoctors are not readily available. Tr. of Oral Arg. 18.Not only as a matter of law but also as a matterof fact, the federal conscience laws have protected pro-lifedoctors ever since FDA approved mifepristone in 2000. Theplaintiffs have not identified any instances where a doctor wasrequired, notwithstanding conscience objections, to perform anabortion or to provide other abortion-related treatment thatviolated the doctor’s conscience. Nor is there any evidence in therecord here of hospitals overriding or failing to accommodatedoctors’ conscience objections.In other words, none of the doctors’declarations says anything like the following: “Here is thetreatment I provided, here is how it violated my conscience, andhere is why the conscience protections were unavailable to me.” Cf.App. 153–154 (Dr. Francis saw a patient suffering complicationsfrom an abortion drug obtained from India; no allegation that Dr.Francis helped perform an abortion); id., at 154 (Dr.Francis witnessed another doctor perform an abortion; no allegationthat the other doctor raised conscience objections or tried not toparticipate); id., at 163–164 (doctor’s hospital treatedwomen suffering complications from abortion drugs; no allegationthat the doctors treating the patients had or raised conscienceobjections to the treatment they provided); id., at 173–174(doctor treated a patient suffering from mifepristonecomplications; no description of what that treatment involved andno statement that the doctor raised a conscience objection toproviding that treatment).In response to all of that, the doctors stillexpress fear that another federal law, the Emergency MedicalTreatment and Labor Act or EMTALA, might be interpreted to overridethose federal conscience laws and to require individual emergencyroom doctors to participate in emergency abortions in somecirc*mstances. See 42 U.S.C. §1395dd. But theGovernment has disclaimed that reading of EMTALA. And we agree withthe Government’s view of EMTALA on that point. EMTALA does notrequire doctors to perform abortions or provide abortion-relatedmedical treatment over their conscience objections because EMTALAdoes not impose obligations on individual doctors. See Brief forUnited States 23, n.3. As the Solicitor General succinctlyand correctly stated, EMTALA does not “override an individualdoctor’s conscience objections.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 18; see also Tr.of Oral Arg. in Moyle v. United States, O. T. 2023,No. 23–726 etc., pp. 88–91 (Moyle Tr.). We agree with theSolicitor General’s representation that federal conscienceprotections provide “broad coverage” and will “shield a doctor whodoesn’t want to provide care in violation of those protections.”Tr. of Oral Arg. 18, 36.The doctors say, however, that emergency roomdoctors summoned to provide emergency treatment may not have timeto invoke federal conscience protections. But as the Governmentcorrectly explained, doctors need not follow a time-intensiveprocedure to invoke federal conscience protections. Reply Brief forUnited States 5. A doctor may simply refuse; federal lawprotects doctors from repercussions when they have “refused” toparticipate in an abortion. §300a–7(c)(1); Reply Brief for UnitedStates 5. And as the Government states, “[h]ospitals mustaccommodate doctors in emergency rooms no less than in othercontexts.” Ibid. For that reason, hospitals and doctorstypically try to plan ahead for how to deal with a doctor’s absencedue to conscience objections. Tr. of Oral Arg. 18; Moyle Tr.89–90. And again, nothing in the record since 2000 supportsplaintiffs’ speculation that doctors will be unable to successfullyinvoke federal conscience protections in emergencycirc*mstances.In short, given the broad and comprehensiveconscience protections guaranteed by federal law, the plaintiffshave not shown—and cannot show—that FDA’s actions will cause themto suffer any conscience injury. Federal law fully protects doctorsagainst being required to provide abortions or other medicaltreatment against their consciences—and therefore breaks any chainof causation between FDA’s relaxed regulation of mifepristone andany asserted conscience injuries to the doctors.[3]2In addition to alleging conscience injuries,the doctors cite various monetary and related injuries that theyallegedly will suffer as a result of FDA’s actions—in particular,diverting resources and time from other patients to treat patientswith mifepristone complications; increasing risk of liability suitsfrom treating those patients; and potentially increasing insurancecosts.Those standing allegations suffer from the sameproblem—a lack of causation. The causal link between FDA’sregulatory actions and those alleged injuries is too speculative orotherwise too attenuated to establish standing.To begin with, the claim that the doctors willincur those injuries as a result of FDA’s 2016 and 2021 relaxedregulations lacks record support and is highly speculative. Thedoctors have not offered evidence tending to suggest that FDA’sderegulatory actions have both caused an increase in the number ofpregnant women seeking treatment from the plaintiff doctorsand caused a resulting diversion of the doctors’ time andresources from other patients. Moreover, the doctors have notidentified any instances in the past where they have been sued orrequired to pay higher insurance costs because they have treatedpregnant women suffering mifepristone complications. Nor have theplaintiffs offered any persuasive evidence or reason to believethat the future will be different.In any event, and perhaps more to the point, thelaw has never permitted doctors to challenge the government’sloosening of general public safety requirements simply because moreindividuals might then show up at emergency rooms or in doctors’offices with follow-on injuries. Stated otherwise, there is noArticle III doctrine of “doctor standing” that allows doctors tochallenge general government safety regulations. Nor will thisCourt now create such a novel standing doctrine out of wholecloth.Consider some examples. EPA rolls back emissionsstandards for power plants—does a doctor have standing to suebecause she may need to spend more time treating asthma patients? Alocal school district starts a middle school football league—does apediatrician have standing to challenge its constitutionalitybecause she might need to spend more time treating concussions? Afederal agency increases a speed limit from 65 to 80 miles perhour—does an emergency room doctor have standing to sue because hemay have to treat more car accident victims? The government repealscertain restrictions on guns—does a surgeon have standing to suebecause he might have to operate on more gunshot victims?The answer is no: The chain of causation issimply too attenuated. Allowing doctors or other healthcareproviders to challenge general safety regulations as unlawfully laxwould be an unprecedented and limitless approach and would allowdoctors to sue in federal court to challenge almost any policyaffecting public health.[4]And in the FDA drug-approval context, virtuallyall drugs come with complications, risks, and side effects. Somedrugs increase the risk of heart attack, some may cause cancer,some may cause birth defects, and some heighten the possibility ofstroke. Approval of a new drug may therefore yield more visits todoctors to treat complications or side effects. So the plaintiffs’loose approach to causation would also essentially allow any doctoror healthcare provider to challenge any FDA decision approving anew drug. But doctors have never had standing to challenge FDA’sdrug approvals simply on the theory that use of the drugs by othersmay cause more visits to doctors.And if we were now to invent a new doctrine ofdoctor standing, there would be no principled way to cabin such asweeping doctrinal change to doctors or other healthcare providers.Firefighters could sue to object to relaxed building codes thatincrease fire risks. Police officers could sue to challenge agovernment decision to legalize certain activities that areassociated with increased crime. Teachers in border states couldsue to challenge allegedly lax immigration policies that lead toovercrowded classrooms.We decline to start the Federal Judiciary downthat uncharted path. That path would seemingly not end untilvirtually every citizen had standing to challenge virtually everygovernment action that they do not like—an approach to standingthat this Court has consistently rejected as flatly inconsistentwith Article III.We recognize that many citizens, including theplaintiff doctors here, have sincere concerns about and objectionsto others using mifepristone and obtaining abortions. But citizensand doctors do not have standing to sue simply becauseothers are allowed to engage in certain activities—at leastwithout the plaintiffs demonstrating how they would be injured bythe government’s alleged under-regulation of others. SeeCoalition for Mercury-Free Drugs v. Sebelius, 671F.3d 1275, 1277 (CADC 2012). Citizens and doctors who object towhat the law allows others to do may always take their concerns tothe Executive and Legislative Branches and seek greater regulatoryor legislative restrictions on certain activities.In sum, the doctors in this case have failed toestablish Article III standing. The doctors have not shown thatFDA’s actions likely will cause them any injury in fact. Theasserted causal link is simply too speculative or too attenuated tosupport Article III standing.[5]3That leaves the medical associations’ argumentthat the associations themselves have organizational standing.Under this Court’s precedents, organizations may have standing “tosue on their own behalf for injuries they have sustained.”Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455U.S. 363, 379, n.19 (1982). In doing so, however,organizations must satisfy the usual standards for injury in fact,causation, and redressability that apply to individuals.Id., at 378–379.According to the medical associations, FDA has“impaired” their “ability to provide services and achieve theirorganizational missions.” Brief for Respondents 43. That argumentdoes not work to demonstrate standing.Like an individual, an organization may notestablish standing simply based on the “intensity of the litigant’sinterest” or because of strong opposition to the government’sconduct, Valley Forge, 454 U.S., at 486, “no matterhow longstanding the interest and no matter how qualified theorganization,” Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.727, 739 (1972). A plaintiff must show “far more than simply asetback to the organization’s abstract social interests.”Havens, 455 U.S., at 379. The plaintiff associationstherefore cannot assert standing simply because they object toFDA’s actions.The medical associations say that they havedemonstrated something more here. They claim to have standing notbased on their mere disagreement with FDA’s policies, but based ontheir incurring costs to oppose FDA’s actions. They say that FDAhas “caused” the associations to conduct their own studies onmifepristone so that the associations can better inform theirmembers and the public about mifepristone’s risks. Brief forRespondents 43. They contend that FDA has “forced” the associationsto “expend considerable time, energy, and resources” draftingcitizen petitions to FDA, as well as engaging in public advocacyand public education. Id., at 44 (quotation marks omitted).And all of that has caused the associations to spend “considerableresources” to the detriment of other spending priorities.Ibid.But an organization that has not suffered aconcrete injury caused by a defendant’s action cannot spend its wayinto standing simply by expending money to gather information andadvocate against the defendant’s action. An organization cannotmanufacture its own standing in that way.The medical associations respond that underHavens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, standing exists whenan organization diverts its resources in response to a defendant’sactions. 455 U.S.363. That is incorrect. Indeed, that theory would mean that allthe organizations in America would have standing to challengealmost every federal policy that they dislike, provided they spenda single dollar opposing those policies. Havens does notsupport such an expansive theory of standing.The relevant question in Havens waswhether a housing counseling organization, HOME, had standing tobring a claim under the Fair Housing Act against Havens Realty,which owned and operated apartment complexes. Id., at 368,378. Havens had provided HOME’s black employees false informationabout apartment availability—a practice known as racial steering.Id., at 366, and n.1, 368. Critically, HOME not onlywas an issue-advocacy organization, but also operated a housingcounseling service. Id., at 368. And when Havens gave HOME’semployees false information about apartment availability, HOME suedHavens because Havens “perceptibly impaired HOME’s ability toprovide counseling and referral services for low- andmoderate-income homeseekers.” Id., at 379. In other words,Havens’s actions directly affected and interfered with HOME’s corebusiness activities—not dissimilar to a retailer who sues amanufacturer for selling defective goods to the retailer.That is not the kind of injury that the medicalassociations have alleged here. FDA’s actions relaxing regulationof mifepristone have not imposed any similar impediment to themedical associations’ advocacy businesses.At most, the medical associations suggest thatFDA is not properly collecting and disseminating information aboutmifepristone, which the associations say in turn makes it moredifficult for them to inform the public about safety risks. But theassociations have not claimed an informational injury, and in anyevent the associations have not suggested that federal law requiresFDA to disseminate such information upon request by members of thepublic. Cf. Federal Election Comm’n v. Akins,524 U.S.11 (1998).Havens was an unusual case, and thisCourt has been careful not to extend the Havens holdingbeyond its context. So too here.Finally, it has been suggested that theplaintiffs here must have standing because if these plaintiffs donot have standing, then it may be that no one would have standingto challenge FDA’s 2016 and 2021 actions. For starters, it is notclear that no one else would have standing to challenge FDA’srelaxed regulation of mifepristone. But even if no one would havestanding, this Court has long rejected that kind of “if not us,who?” argument as a basis for standing. See Clapper, 568U.S., at 420–421; Valley Forge, 454 U.S., at489; Richardson, 418 U.S., at 179–180. The“assumption” that if these plaintiffs lack “standing to sue, no onewould have standing, is not a reason to find standing.”Schlesinger, 418 U.S., at 227. Rather, some issues maybe left to the political and democratic processes: The Framers ofthe Constitution did not “set up something in the nature of anAthenian democracy or a New England town meeting to oversee theconduct of the National Government by means of lawsuits in federalcourts.” Richardson, 418 U.S., at 179; seeTexas, 599 U.S., at 685.*  *  *The plaintiffs have sincere legal, moral,ideological, and policy objections to elective abortion and toFDA’s relaxed regulation of mifepristone. But under Article III ofthe Constitution, those kinds of objections alone do not establisha justiciable case or controversy in federal court. Here, theplaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that FDA’s relaxed regulatoryrequirements likely would cause them to suffer an injury in fact.For that reason, the federal courts are the wrong forum foraddressing the plaintiffs’ concerns about FDA’s actions. Theplaintiffs may present their concerns and objections to thePresident and FDA in the regulatory process, or to Congress and thePresident in the legislative process. And they may also expresstheir views about abortion and mifepristone to fellow citizens,including in the political and electoral processes.“No principle is more fundamental to thejudiciary’s proper role in our system of government than theconstitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actualcases or controversies.” Simon, 426 U.S., at 37. Wereverse the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for theFifth Circuit and remand the case for further proceedingsconsistent with this opinion.It is so ordered.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES_________________Nos. 23–235 and 23–236_________________FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION,etal., PETITIONER23–235v.ALLIANCE FOR HIPPOCRATIC MEDICINE,etal.DANCO LABORATORIES, L.L.C.,PETITIONER23–236v.ALLIANCE FOR HIPPOCRATIC MEDICINE,etal.on writs of certiorari to the united statescourt of appeals for the fifth circuit[June 13, 2024]Justice Thomas, concurring.I join the Court’s opinion in full because itcorrectly applies our precedents to conclude that the Alliance forHippocratic Medicine and other plaintiffs lack standing. Ourprecedents require a plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant’schallenged actions caused his asserted injuries. And, the Courtaptly explains why plaintiffs have failed to establish that theFood and Drug Administration’s changes to the regulation ofmifepristone injured them. Ante, at 13–24.The Court also rejects the plaintiff doctors’theory that they have third-party standing to assert the rights oftheir patients. Ante, at 21, n.5. Our third-partystanding precedents allow a plaintiff to assert the rights ofanother person when the plaintiff has a “close relationship withthe person who possesses the right” and “there is a hindrance tothe possessor’s ability to protect his own interests.”Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S.125, 130 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Applyingthese precedents, the Court explains that the doctors cannotestablish third-party standing to sue for violations of theirpatients’ rights without showing an injury of their own.Ante, at 21, n.5. But, there is a far simpler reasonto reject this theory: Our third-party standing doctrine ismistaken. As I have previously explained, a plaintiff cannotestablish an Article III case or controversy by asserting anotherperson’s rights.[1] See JuneMedical Services L.L.C. v. Russo, 591 U.S.299, 366 (2020) (Thomas,J., dissenting); Kowalski, 543U.S., at 135 (Thomas,J., concurring). So, just asabortionists lack standing to assert the rights of their clients,doctors who oppose abortion cannot vicariously assert the rights oftheir patients.I write separately to highlight what appear tobe similar problems with another theory of standing asserted inthis suit. The Alliance and other plaintiff associations claim thatthey have associational standing to sue for their members’injuries.[2] Under the Court’sprecedents, “an association has standing to bring suit on behalf ofits members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing tosue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect aregermane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claimasserted nor the relief requested requires the participation ofindividual members in the lawsuit.” Hunt v. WashingtonState Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U.S.333, 343 (1977). If an association can satisfy theserequirements, we allow the association to pursue its members’claims, without joining those members as parties to the suit.Associational standing, however, is simplyanother form of third-party standing. And, the Court has neverexplained or justified either doctrine’s expansion of Article IIIstanding. In an appropriate case, we should explain just how theConstitution permits associational standing.IAssociational standing raises constitutionalconcerns by relaxing both the injury and redressabilityrequirements for Article III standing. It also upsets other legaldoctrines.First, associational standing conflicts withArticle III by permitting an association to assert its members’injuries instead of its own. The “judicial power” conferred byArticle III “is limited to cases and controversies of the sorttraditionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial process.”See June Medical, 591 U.S., at 364 (opinion ofThomas,J.) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]oascertain the scope of Article III’s case-or-controversyrequirement,” courts therefore “refer directly to the traditional,fundamental limitations upon the powers of common-law courts.”Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). Traditionally, aplaintiff had to show a violation of his own rights to have hisclaim considered by a common-law court. See id., at 364–366.So, “private parties could not bring suit to vindicate theconstitutional [or other legal] rights of individuals who are notbefore the Court.” Id., at 359. “After all, ‘[t]he provinceof the court is, solely, to decide on the rights ofindividuals,’” not to answer legal debates in the abstract.Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Laufer, 601 U.S. 1, 10 (2023)(Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting Marbury v.Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 170 (1803)); see also ante, at5–7.Associational standing seems to run roughshodover this traditional understanding of the judicial power. Ourdoctrine permits an association to have standing based purely upona member’s injury, not its own. If a single member of anassociation has suffered an injury, our doctrine permits thatassociation to seek relief for its entire membership—even if theassociation has tens of millions of other, non-injured members. SeeBrief for Professor F. Andrew Hessick as Amicus Curiae 28(explaining that, among other associations, the AmericanAssociation of Retired People’s “potential standing is staggering”because our doctrine permits it to “sue to redress” the injury of asingle member out of its “almost thirty-eight million members”). AsI have already explained in the context of third-party standing,Article III does not allow a plaintiff to seek to vindicate someoneelse’s injuries. See June Medical, 591 U.S., at364–366 (opinion of Thomas,J.); Kowalski, 543U.S., at 135 (opinion of Thomas,J.). It is difficult tosee why that logic should not apply with equal force to anassociation as to any other plaintiff. I thus have serious doubtsthat an association can have standing to vicariously assert amember’s injury.The Alliance’s attempted use of ourassociational-standing doctrine illustrates how far we have strayedfrom the traditional rule that plaintiffs must assert only theirown injuries. The Alliance is an association whose members areother associations. See 1 App. 9–10. None of its members aredoctors. Instead, the Alliance seeks to have associational standingbased on injuries to the doctors who are members of its memberassociations. Thus, the allegedly injured parties—the doctors—aretwo degrees removed from the party before us pursuing thoseinjuries.Second, our associational-standing doctrine doesnot appear to comport with the requirement that the plaintiffpresent an injury that the court can redress. For a plaintiff tohave standing, a court must be able to “provid[e] a remedy that canredress the plaintiff’s injury.” Uzuegbunam v.Preczewski, 592 U.S. 279, 291 (2021) (emphasis added). But,as explained, associational standing creates a mismatch: Althoughthe association is the plaintiff in the suit, it has no injury toredress. The party who needs the remedy—the injured member—is notbefore the court. Without such members as parties to the suit, itis questionable whether “relief to these nonparties ...exceed[s] constitutional bounds.” Association of AmericanPhysicians & Surgeons v. FDA, 13 F.4th 531,540 (CA6 2021); see also Department of Homeland Security v.New York, 589 U.S. ___, ___ (2020) (Gorsuch,J.,concurring in grant of stay) (explaining that remedies “are meantto redress the injuries sustained by a particular plaintiff in aparticular lawsuit”); Brief for Professor F. Andrew Hessick asAmicus Curiae 18 (“A bedrock principle of the Anglo-Americanlegal system was that the right to a remedy for an injury waspersonal”).Consider the remedial problem when anassociation seeks an injunction, as the Alliance did here. See 1App. 113. “We have long held” that our equity jurisdiction islimited to “the jurisdiction in equity exercised by the High Courtof Chancery in England at the time of the adoption of theConstitution.” Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v.Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S.308, 318 (1999). And, “as a general rule, American courts ofequity did not provide relief beyond the parties to the case.”Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. 667, 717 (2018)(Thomas,J., concurring). For associations, that principlewould mean that the relief could not extend beyond the association.But, if a court entered “[a]n injunction that bars a defendant fromenforcing a law or regulation against the specific party before thecourt—the associational plaintiff—[it would] not satisfyArticle III because it w[ould] not redress an injury.”Association of American Physicians & Surgeons, 13F.4th, at 540 (internal quotation marks omitted).[3]Our precedents have provided a workaround forthis obvious remedial problem through the invention of theso-called “universal injunction.” Universal injunctions typically“prohibit the Government from enforcing a policy with respect toanyone.” Trump, 585 U.S., at 713, n.1(Thomas,J., concurring). By providing relief beyond theparties to the case, this remedy is “legally and historicallydubious.” Id., at 721; see also Labrador v.Poe, 601 U.S. ___, ___–___ (2024) (slip op., at 4–5)(Gorsuch, J., concurring in grant of stay). It seems no coincidencethat associational standing’s “emergence in the 1960s overlaps withthe emergence of [this] remedial phenomenon” of a similarlyquestionable nature. Association of American Physicians &Surgeons, 13 F.4th, at 541. Because no party should bepermitted to obtain an injunction in favor of nonparties, I havedifficulty seeing why an association should be permitted to do sofor its members. Associational standing thus seems to distort ourtraditional understanding of the judicial power.In addition to these Article III concerns, thereis tension between associational standing and other areas of law.First, the availability of associational standing subverts theclass-action mechanism. A class action allows a named plaintiff torepresent others with similar injuries, but it is subject to themany requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.Associational standing achieves that same end goal: One lawsuit canprovide relief to a large group of people. “As compared to a classaction,” however, associational standing seems to require“show[ing] an injury to only a single member,” and the association“need not show that litigation by representation is superior toindividual litigation.” 13A C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper,Federal Practice and Procedure §3531.9.5, pp. 879–880 (3d ed.,Supp. 2023); see also Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.23(a).Associational standing thus allows a party to effectively bring aclass action without satisfying any of the ordinary requirements.Second, associational standing creates the possibility ofasymmetrical preclusion. The basic idea behind preclusion is that aparty gets only one bite at the apple. If a party litigates andloses an issue or claim, it can be barred from reasserting thatsame issue or claim in another suit. In general, preclusionprevents the relitigation of claims or issues only by a party to aprevious action, and we have been careful to limit the exceptionsto that rule. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S.880, 892–893 (2008). In the context of associational standing,the general rule would mean that preclusion applies only to theassociation, even though the purpose of the association’s suit isto assert the injuries of its members. See id., at 893–896.But, if the association loses, it is not clear whether the adversejudgment would bind the members. See Automobile Workers v.Brock, 477 U.S.274, 290 (1986) (suggesting that, if an association fails toadequately represent its members, “a judgment won against it mightnot preclude subsequent claims by the association’s members withoutoffending due process principles”). Associational standing mightallow a member two bites at the apple—after an association’s claimsare rejected, the underlying members might be able to assert theexact same issues or claims in a suit in their own names.In short, our associational-standing doctrineappears to create serious problems, both constitutional andotherwise.III am particularly doubtful ofassociational-standing doctrine because the Court has neverattempted to reconcile it with the traditional understanding of thejudicial power. Instead, the Court departed from that traditionalunderstanding without explanation, seemingly by accident. To date,the Court has provided only practical reasons for its doctrine.For over a century and a half, the Court did nothave a separate standing doctrine for associations. As far as I cantell, the Court did not expressly contemplate such a doctrine untilthe late 1950s. In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.Patterson, 357 U.S.449 (1958), the Court permitted an association to assert theconstitutional rights of its members to prevent the disclosure ofits membership lists. While the Court allowed the NAACP to raise achallenge on behalf of its members, it also acknowledged that theNAACP had arguably faced an injury of its own. Id., at459–460. The Court, however, soon discarded any notion that anassociation needed to have its own injury, creating our modernassociational-standing doctrine. In National Motor FreightTraffic Assn., Inc. v. United States, 372 U.S.246 (1963) (per curiam), the Court suggested that anuninjured industry group had standing to challenge a tariffschedule on behalf of its members. Id., at 247. The Courtoffered no explanation for how that theory of standing comportedwith the traditional understanding of the judicial power. In fact,the Court’s entire analysis consisted of a one-paragraph orderdenying rehearing. Since then, however, the Court has parroted that“[e]ven in the absence of injury to itself, an associationmay have standing solely as the representative of its members.”Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.490, 511 (1975) (emphasis added; citing National MotorFreight Traffic Assn., 372 U.S. 246); see also,e.g., Automobile Workers, 477 U.S., at281. The Court has gone so far as to hold that a state agency—not amembership organization at all—had associational standing to“asser[t] the claims of the Washington apple growers and dealerswho form its constituency.” Hunt, 432 U.S., at344.Despite its continued reliance on associationalstanding, the Court has yet to explain how the doctrine comportswith Article III. When once asked to “reconsider and reject theprinciples of associational standing” in favor of the class-actionmechanism, the Court justified the doctrine solely by reference toits “special features, advantageous both to the individualsrepresented and to the judicial system as a whole.” AutomobileWorkers, 477 U.S., at 288–289. Those “special features”included an association’s “pre-existing reservoir of expertise andcapital,” and the fact that people often join an association “tocreate an effective vehicle for vindicating interests that theyshare with others.” Id., at 289–290. But, considerations ofpractical judicial policy cannot overcome the Constitution’smandates. The lack of any identifiable justification furthersuggests that the Court should reconsider itsassociational-standing doctrine.*  *  *No party challenges our associational-standingdoctrine today. That is understandable; the Court consistentlyapplies the doctrine, discussing only the finer points of itsoperation. See, e.g., Students for FairAdmissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of HarvardCollege, 600 U.S. 181, 199–201 (2023). In this suit, rejectingour associational-standing doctrine is not necessary to concludethat the plaintiffs lack standing. In an appropriate case, however,the Court should address whether associational standing can besquared with Article III’s requirement that courts respect thebounds of their judicial power.